Editorial Introduction

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Translating Happiness

This year the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) proclaimed March 20th the International Day of Happiness. This day is premised on international recognition of the pursuit of happiness as a fundamental human goal, and a means of promoting sustainable development. International acknowledgement of the important role that happiness plays in development is also displayed in the 2012 World Happiness Report, as well as a host of recent changes to national social policies, community infrastructures and health services. The recent shift towards the inclusion of happiness in determining sustainable development is exemplified in Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness (GNH) and reflected as an indicator of a population’s social progress and well-being (e.g., Gross Happiness Product (GHP), Britain’s General Well-Being (GWB), the New Economics Foundation Happy Planet Index, the UN Human Development Index and Legatum Prosperity Index). A rank of the world’s happiest countries along a scale of one to ten is provided in Columbia University’s Earth Institute’s 2013 World Happiness Report, based on a global survey conducted between 2010 and 2012 (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2013). As with other global reports, the 2013 World Happiness Report proposes greater global expenditures on health and social systems with a particular emphasis on psy-interventions. This report is unique in its explicit focus on public policy, and more specifically, the role of happiness in the current “major policy debate about the objective for public policy” worldwide, depicted here in the form of the Sustainable Development Goals 2015-2030 (emphasis added; Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2013, p. 3).

Sachs, an author of the report, Director of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and head of the Earth Institute at Columbia asserts that the stark realities of global poverty and environmental destruction require more sustainable approaches to the recognition and achievement of global happiness: “It is no longer good enough for economies to grow” (SDSN, 2013). Within this report psy-knowledge and professional expertise is represented in images and ideas of nation’s development, environmental stresses and resilient cities, as well as access to mental health interventions as resources that can be used to “help get the planet back on course” (SDSN, 2013).

This special issue of Health, Culture and Society explores the multiple and contested ways of knowing happiness embodied in contemporary translations of happiness. According to Rose, translation provides for the possibility of government: “In the dynamics of translation, alignments are forged between the objectives of those wishing to govern and the personal projects of those organizations, groups, and individuals who are the subjects of government” (1999b, p. 48). A desire to construct a comprehensive picture of the important role that translations of happiness – as made to appear in social philosophy, featured in the emerging field of positive psychology, mapped in global happiness indexes, or communicated by concepts such as ‘well-being’ or ‘quality of life’ – play in contemporary understandings of human development and social progress provided the impetus for this special issue. Translations of happiness organize consciousness of a beyond that is as yet, already done. Cultural representations of how happiness does or does not ‘look’, where happiness is or is not located, when happiness can be expected or not expected, the types of people who are ‘really’ happy, and what must be done to achieve, secure, recover and/or restore happiness, all provide a view to the dominant values and assumptions that organize our everyday lives.
Happiness and Adjustment

Psy-knowledge and practices translate the philosophical dilemma of human happiness into a technical problem. This act of translation involves complex processes of subject formation that activate and invoke the authority of science in the conduct of human life. Depression features prominently among psy-understandings of happiness. Within this issue depression is conceived as a social phenomenon, a language and a culturally-defined mode of participation, a product of modern science and an expression of the definitional power of what Rose refers to as the “psy-sciences” (1998, p. 13). In the cultural production of knowledge about depression, hegemonic images and ideas of happiness already in circulation in everyday life acquire a technical character which elicit the collection, synthesis, transfer and translation of evidence-based knowledge regarding the empirical reality of “the good life”, the characteristics of lives worth living, and the facilitators and barriers to happiness for all.

In the modern project, science has come to symbolize the liberation of the autonomous individual from the constraints of religious and traditional orders. Through depression, psychiatry provides a means of framing experiences shaped by those newly discovered “freedoms” from dominant social orders. For instance, technical knowledge about depression provides a set of instructions for how to interpret the appearance of alienation as a need for greater integration. Through depression, responsibility for the experience of alienation is now located in specific modes of conducted particular to a new type of person, the “maladjusted” individual. Rose observes a common contemporary understanding in which “Maladjustment, it appeared, was at the heart of dissatisfactions” (1999a, p. 70). The notion of adjustment, of adapting to the conditions believed to produce (un)happiness, presupposes the desirability of conformity, if not its inevitability. In treating maladjustment as the reason for unhappiness, and a signal of the need of therapeutic intervention, questions concerning how obligatory conditions have been imagined, and what interests are involved in their articulation, become superfluous and detractive from the real issue at hand: The prevailing unhappiness of a particular population or populations.

As a science of adaptive behavioural techniques and technologies, psychology provides a way to readjust individuals’ relations to their social positions. Dissatisfaction can be addressed and resolved by severing ‘unhealthy’ relations and seeking a position that works better. The happiness ideal is not problematic. The availability and accessibility of the means of fulfilling this ideal (in its absence) are problematic. Psy-expertise reigns foremost among the means of fulfillment, which represents happiness as a choice which when chosen, can empower the individual to become “an entrepreneur of itself” (Rose, 1998, p. 158). As Rose asserts in Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (1998, p. 158):

Become whole, become what you want, become yourself; the individual is to become, as it were, an entrepreneur of itself, seeking to maximize its own powers, its own happiness, its own quality of life, through enhancing its autonomy and then instrumentalizing its autonomous choices in the service of its life-style. The self is to style its life through acts of choice, and when it cannot conduct its life according to this norm of
choice, it is to seek expert assistance.

Under the auspices of unlimited human development and social progress, happiness appears as a *sign of completion*. Normative orders are aligned with ‘natural’ orders, and becoming whole involves being able to fulfill a particular life-style.

In *The Care of the Self*, Foucault describes the intimate relation between modern medicine and the government of the soul (1986, pp. 99-100):

Thus, medicine was not conceived simply as a technique of intervention, relying, in cases of illness, on remedies and operations. It was also supposed to define, in the form of a corpus of knowledge and rules, a way of living, a reflective mode of relation to oneself, to one’s body, to food, to wakefulness and sleep, to the various activities, and to the environment. Medicine was to propose, in the form of a regimen, a voluntary and rational structure of conduct.

In defining a way of living and a reflective mode of relating to oneself, medicine provides a means of effecting and enactment of “government at a distance” (Rose, 1999b, p. 49; 1992). According to Rose, governing at a distance is made possible when political authorities create “alignments between political aims and the strategies of experts” and the personal desires of citizens (1999b, p. 49). In proposing a “voluntary and rational structure of conduct” (Foucault, 1986, p. 100), medicine contributes to the power of the modern project of “making-up citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom” (Rose, 1992, p. 174).

**Happiness and Its Role in the Formation of a Technology of Behavior**

The 2003 *Report of the President's Council on Bioethics*, “Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness,” addresses the challenges posed by new therapeutic technologies. The Report finds that the pursuit of happiness, while it may be different for each individual, is shaped by our desire “to become superior and stay superior” (2003, p. 102). According to the Report:

Biotechnology offers exciting and promising prospects for healing the sick and relieving the suffering. But exactly because of their impressive powers to alter the workings of body and mind, the “dual uses” of the same technologies make them attractive also to people who are not sick but who would use them to look younger, perform better, feel happier, or become more “perfect.”

The much-celebrated image of the independent, autonomous individual, not subject to control from the outside, may be at risk of falling behind and losing hold of *reality* in the pursuit for perfectibility. Being superior is no longer good enough (or at least, not sustainable). The individual is instructed to think beyond superiority, and as such ensure its sustainability (framed in resilience discourse in terms of endurance). In this context, becoming superior and staying superior involve catching up to the culturally established expectations of the self. As Elliot writes of the American Dream in *Better than Well*, “It is less a story about trying to get ahead than about the terror of being left behind, and the humiliation of crossing the finish line dead last, while the crowd points at you and laughs” (2003, p. 298). Refusing to enter the race, “even that publicly announces something to other Americans about who you are and what you value” (Elliot, 2003, p. 298). Appearing as one who does not take an active interest...
in the established values of the group, the predetermined values ordained in psychiatric discourse, could mean appearing as one beyond help and understanding.

The notion that there are people who are beyond understanding, for whom there is no possibility of reciprocity of perspectives, is steeped in ongoing histories of colonialism. This notion has been strategically deployed to justify the exploitation, marginalization and oppression of colonized peoples. Analyzing happiness as an interactionally-achieved cultural phenomenon, we can situate assumptions about the “responsible individual” within a history of colonialism (Aubrecht, 2010; Fabris & Aubrecht, Forthcoming).

Postcolonial theorist Bhabha can help us to think through the processes of subjectification made possible by discourses of depression. In The Location of Culture Bhabha (1994), provides a description of ‘beyond’ that sheds new light on the problem of common unhappiness, while casting a shadow over the conventional wisdom that views present conditions in dualistic terms as “a break or bonding with the past and future.” For Bhabha (1994, p. 4),

‘Beyond’ signifies spatial distance, marks progress, promises the future; but our intimations of exceeding the barrier or boundary - the very act of going beyond - are unknowable, unrepresentable, without a return to the ‘present’ which, in the process of repetition, becomes disjunct and displaced.

Dominant understandings of the self mirror conventional imaginations of the present as either a break or a bond, rather than a space between (Titchkosky, 2011). This way of thinking is restricted. The individual/past or culture/future cannot be imagined without first making reference to the inevitability of the self/present.

What, at first glance, may appear as obstacles to the pursuit of happiness are actually fundamental to the aims of progress. Rather than prevent action, the perception of obstacles to the pursuit of happiness license the organization of action, collect otherwise disparate interests, and authorize certain voices to take command. A eugenicist and controversial actor in the modern drama, Skinner, also takes up the notion of ‘beyond’, and in a way that has arguably helped lay the foundation for Rose’s critical analysis of governance analytics. Rose is interested in “thinking beyond the State” (1992), through rethinking the powers of freedom. Skinner, however, attends to the possibilities for happier populations and a better world beyond the horizon of freedom. In his infamous book, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) Skinner writes, “The important thing is not so much to know how to solve a problem as to know how to look for a solution” (p. 153), and the solution tends to appear as a kind of “planned diversification” (p. 154). Once framed by interpretive schemas organized by problem/solution binaries human particularity can have little relevance for meaningful existence beyond the greater diversification of populations.

Beyond a Renunciation of Unhappiness

Freud’s (1989[1917]) work on melancholia introduces the idea that there may be a need to lose happiness before happiness can be problematized. The relationship between unhappiness and depression is a paradoxical one. Perspectives, such as the one represented in depression, can be read as symptoms of governance. Ways of perceiving and thinking, or making, the world can be used to both access and assess problematic conditions of governance and develop new ways to address and amend them. The paradox is that the perspective on governance depression offers (and with it modern life conceived in terms of life itself), a renunciation of the “unfulfillability” of the social ideal of happiness, constitutes that which it renounces (Butler, 1997, p. 142). As a mode of making sense of and governing unhappiness, depression demands the existence of unhappy selves, individuals and organizations, in need of government.

Butler (1997) takes up this paradox of governance in her examination of melancholy and gender in The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. According to Butler, the cultural intolerance towards homosexuality
relies on the inhibition of homosexuality for its distinction (original emphasis; 1997, p. 143):

In this scenario, renunciation requires the very homosexuality that it condemns, not as its external object, but as its own most treasured source of sustenance. The act of renouncing homosexuality thus paradoxically strengthens homosexuality, but it strengthens homosexuality precisely as the power of renunciation. Renunciation becomes the aim and vehicle of satisfaction.

Thinking with Rose, one might say that renunciation becomes the motivator. For Rose, the ‘modern’ individual’s quest for self-discovery is driven by the belief that “Satisfaction was provided by the motivators. And the motivators were not physical or material, but psychological. Interesting work, feelings of achievement, feelings of personal growth, responsibility, and recognition – these were what made people happy.” (1999a, p. 111). Renunciation becomes the modern project; through renunciation the individual becomes whole.

The renunciation of unhappiness that drives the modern project strengthens unhappiness, thus strengthening its own drive for completion. The modern project cannot deliver on its promise of complete happiness because its power, authority and legitimacy are dependent on the recognition of unhappiness. Its status as a project is contingent on its capacity to articulate its problem - unhappiness.

Discourses of depression give modernity a task capable of organizing and incorporating the interests of individuals and collectives, while satisfying their needs for individuality and distinction. Depression produces a common sense of unhappiness as a human condition that can be revolutionized, alleviated and potentially cured given the appropriate changes in the cultural practices of everyday life. This not only makes unhappiness treatable, it alters what it means to be human, while at the same time stripping humanity of its constitutive alterity.

Rose’s approach to happiness registers Foucault’s understanding of happiness as an instrument for governing the soul. Rose, however, makes the problematic character of governance through freedom much more explicit. He illustrates how understandings of the self are shaped by psy-technologies and techniques of governance. The way individuals experience themselves through knowledge of their desires is influenced by the ways they have of conceiving themselves as subjects. The notion of the self provides a way to map out what kinds of government are effective and capable of achieving the desired results. The self thus offers a method for measuring the advancement of a society and the modernist project.

The modern project involves more than just economic growth. One way that this ‘more’ is accomplished is through the coordination of competing forms of government. And yet, at the same time, economic growth matters. No one wants to finish last or be left behind, particularly when what is at stake is as Sachs suggests, the planet, life itself.

(Un)Happy (Re)Assemblages

Given recognition that, “Programmes and technologies of government, then, are assemblages which may have a rationality, but this is not one of a coherence of origin or singular essence” (Rose, 1999, p. 276), the papers in this issue are diverse. Even as we are inundated by images and ideals of happiness we are at the same time reminded that happiness, whatever it is, continues to elude us. Happiness, it would seem is something we all strive for, something that escapes us; the one thing we can never really have or know completely; a quality, a quantity, a way of being. And yet, we remain at a loss. What is happiness? Rather than answer the question of what happiness is, this special issue provides unique insight into some of the many ways we have of knowing happiness, as a question, as a mode of translation, and as such, a program of government; or as Greco and Stenner, as well as Wright, suggest, a dispositif. Dominant images, ideas and ideals of happiness mediate consciousness of translation as life itself, where life is understood as a bearing and as something that must be born. It is according to this logic,
however, that life can be oriented to as burden (too much to bear) and the objective reality of happiness tied to the appearance of life as some ‘thing’ suffered.

Greco and Stenner’s discussion of a happiness dispositif directs attention to the relation between subjectivity and economies, while at the same time departing from governmentality studies by attending to “affective issues at play in these economies of power, and to the problem of desire.” Central to the happiness dispositif is a “bifurcated approach to happiness” that divides the ‘material and the mental’, internal feelings and desires from external facts, splitting the subject from the world. Greco and Stenner further suggest that for Keynes happiness offered a means of managing pessimism, producing a sense of the ‘not-yet’. Also drawing on Foucault, Wright proposes a radical alternative to the notions of well-being and flourishing espoused in positive psychology and dominant within Happiness Studies on the grounds that they translate happiness into a utilitarian neoliberal governmentality and biopolitics. Wright also draws attention to a bifurcation between East and West, where current western mythologies of happiness are imbued with Eastern origins, in this case Bhutan. Wright’s paper recalls Said’s seminal work Orientalism, which is further developed in the following paper by McKay. Wright notes that rather than Buddhist principles, Gross National Happiness (GNH) indicators reflect a market mentality and an interest in modernization and capitalism. For Wright the happiness dispositif is a distinctly neoliberal dispositif.

The opening papers in the issue all draw attention to the need to consider what Illich refers to as the “medicalization of the national budget” (1976, p. 49), as expressed in the GNH. McKay proposes that, “although happiness is argued to be the ultimate end of all governmentality, in order to serve as that end, it first needs to be translated into a means for bolstering the economy.” McKay focuses on the relation between translations of happiness that take the form of ‘mental capital’ and ‘mental well-being’ and an interest in increasing the productivity of workers. He suggests that current understandings of preference as an objective measure of subjective states produce faith in economic growth as a measure of happiness. In the next paper, Duncan also speaks to preference and the emergence of ‘preference patterns’ in consumer behavior in his paper. According to Duncan, “an awareness of an ever-impending disorder of depression enables us to act upon ourselves as subjects capable of unlimited happiness.”

Kingfisher, Cantin and Tanaka’s papers explicitly challenge a notion of happiness as the ground of human universals. Through an examination of the ‘Samoan way’ Kingfisher offers a view to the current fixation on happiness as a EuroAmerican cultural formation, and through this, a powerful counter to the Orientalism of Happiness Studies. Central to the Samoan way is a collectivist orientation that exposes the individualism of neoliberalism. Kingfisher further develops happiness as a cultural obsession, but in a way that focuses more explicitly on cultural rather than psychological dynamics. Cantin critically examines notions of ‘personhood’ and ‘the good life’ as culturally and historically specific. Cantin’s paper encourages nuanced and situated understandings of these concepts that challenge their easy dismissal. Despite the cultural authority of western neoliberal definitions of the good life and personhood, there are yet other, and no less vital, ways of relating which these constructs embody. The paper that follows considers how dominant cultural scripts can be arid are routinely negotiated and re-written. Through an examination of ‘leprosy literature’ Tanaka provides a view to ‘patient writing’ as a site of translation. Within this work translation appears as a space of affirmation – not only of the legitimacy of institutional goals, but also of the meaning and value of lives lived within institutionalized settings. Tanaka suggests that even as governments, institutions and relief organizations could be viewed as using patients’ stories and poetry about stigma they faced in their communities to advance political objectives, leprosy literature should not be reduced to a product of coercion.

All of these papers set the stage for a critical relation to translations of happiness expressed, for example, in global cartographies of mental health and illness that reduce the meaning of life to the number of years lived
(Titchkosky & Aubrecht, Forthcoming). One poignant example is the geography of depression constructed out of the findings from *The Global Burden of Disease Study 2010* (Ferrari et al., 2013), summarized and presented as a world map laid flat and published for public consumption in the American newspaper *The Washington Post* (Dewey, 2013). The map, and the findings on which it is based, support the World Health Organization (WHO)’s (2012) representations of depression as one of the leading causes of disability worldwide. Findings also support the WHO’s assertion that women are disproportionately affected by depression. This map makes depression visible as a global “public health priority” that is disproportionately affecting people in the Middle East and North Africa, “costing people in the region years off their lives.” Pathos is thus central to the new science of happiness and the modes of adaptation it enjoins. Through pathos happiness is reconceived as a defining moment in the textualization of a global body, and with this textualization, the modeling of a *global future*. In this integrated future both goals and the means of their accomplishment are represented in universalizing ways. McMellon’s paper attends the social construction and textualization of life. As with previous papers in the issue, this textualization is accomplished through social constructions of happiness and their “embodied negotiations” (Werner, 2010), which Werner describes as, “the negotiation of social position by subjects marked by race, gender and class is always also a negotiation of spatial position in and between localities structured through raced, gendered and class relations” (2010, p. 725).

As Wright suggests, there is a distinctly bipolitical component of happiness discourse which is made visible in plans and policies that aim to advance the measurement and regulation of life itself in the interest, paradoxically, of life itself. The primary aim being the *extension* of the power of the human sciences over the mental lives of individuals and populations and, with this, the authority of scientized and bureaucratized notions of what it means to be human. As several papers in this collection argue, hegemonic understandings of happiness under neoliberal politics frame the meaning of happiness in terms of capability.

**Resilience: ‘Right’ and ‘Wrong’ Ways of ‘Doing’ Crisis**

Drawing on findings from the World Database of Happiness (Headey & Wearing, 1992) Veenhoven states that, “In modern western nations happiness differs little across social categories such as rich and poor or males and females. The difference is rather in psychological competence” (2004, p. 77). This then raises the question of *who* (or perhaps more accurately, ‘what type of person’) is psychologically capable, *who* has the perceived competence (i.e., expertise), that qualifies them as being able to do life well. One of the ways that capability is determined is through notions of resilience. Through resilience boundaries are drawn between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’; and through resilience, knowledge gained on the types of people who have proved they can maximize investments in them, and therefore deserve the opportunity to have a try at doing life. For Zola (1977), the almost exclusive focus on doing is a marker of our time. As such, it carries with it the risk of reproducing current relations of power.

A consideration of normative responses to a perceived “crisis in happiness” (2007, p. 7) has served as a fundamental guiding principle in assembling this issue. According to Ahmed (2007, p. 7),

Happiness is looked for where it is expected to be found, even when happiness is reported as missing. What is striking is that the crisis in happiness has not put social ideals into question and if anything has reinvigorated their hold over both psychic and political life.

Modern happiness projects appear to be oriented more to the idea of *what* is already lost in translation than the loss of happiness itself. Thus the need for a turn to language, in this case what Seligman refers to as the ‘new vocabulary of resilience’ (Seligman, 2009; Aubrecht, 2012) discussed in variegated ways by many of the issue’s authors. Resilience makes the happiness/neoliberal dispositif into what Henry Giroux (2008) refers to as a “bipolitics of disposability.” According to Giroux, the transformation of the social state into a corporate state so central within neoliberal policy agendas places the authority to decide on questions over life and death in the
invisible hands of the market (Girioux, 2008, p. 594). Life is made meaningful in terms of survival, and what was once a question of the ‘good life’ translated into a question of survival. The emphasis on ‘flourishing’ can then be reconceived as an attempt to shift the public gaze forward, towards a future. The symbolic significance of the word future cannot be underestimated. The very possibility of speaking of a future offers an expression of having already survived, of knowing how to survive – having expertise in survival (by virtue of having already done it), and of being a survivor.

There is thus a sense of fatalism to the contemporary optimism (Berlant, 2011). Vocabularies of resilience carry forward a notion of survival as a doing that is already done. Resilience recalls the embodied experience of having survived, the way it can invoke the specter a life lived despite the certainty of death. What is affirmed in resilience is neither the worth of individuals, nor even the reality of adversity, as much as it is the discipline of psychology and the legitimacy of this way of knowing, thinking, doing and feeling. Seligman, the individual credited as founder of positive psychology and expert on resilience and even ‘authentic’ happiness, is forthright with this. He says the point of positive psychology is to return psychology to its mission of making normal people more productive, i.e., stronger better workers (Seligman, 2011; Seligman, 2008; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). But the problem is, psychology does not know what it wants, it cannot know what normal is without first presupposing its absence. That is what resilience does. It is through resilience that a sense of the normal can be constructed, through resilience that the neoliberal subject and the fantasy of a universal experience can be made ‘real’, observable, tangible and affective, something that can be touched, and something with which we are moved. New vocabularies of resilience order and mechanize relations so that a judgment can be made: I have survived because capitalism has succeeded. The strivings and struggles of marginalized, disabled, pathologized and psychologized individuals and groups are reduced to no more than a backdrop against which capitalism can appear as a ‘human’ institution, one that cares.

Vitalism offers a counter to resilience discourses that mystify adversity and construct social inequality, exploitation and oppression as natural tests of endurance (Greco & Stenner, this issue; Overboe, 2007). And yet, dominant images and ideas of vitalism are also embedded within and circulate by way of the happiness apparatus in the form of new normals.

‘New Normals’

The papers in this issue address how unexamined notions of happiness have been activated as a means to justify what disability studies theorist Lennard Davis refers to as the “hegemony of normalcy” (1995, p. 49), as well as the inequitable and oppressive relations normalcy both relies on and reproduces (as made to appear in conceptions of the ‘global burden’ of disability). Resilience provides a means of returning to normalcy, but this return is not just any return. Resilience discourse communicates the need for a particular type of return; a return capable of making normalcy better, more profitable and productive, but also more sustainable. In the midst of many ‘new normals’, expressed in a host of recent product branding and marketing strategies, including the American-based company Johnson & Johnson’s (2013) campaign for Tylenol (a trademark for the pain reliever paracetamol), “Get back to normal, whatever your normal is”, It is clear that not any normal will do. Normal, “whatever it is,” is only really normal if it endures; can only be counted as normal, and measured as such, if it makes better, and in making better lives longer.

Once situated within vocabularies of resilience, words such as ‘normal’ evoke the need for a cultural diagnostics. Thinking with Girioux’s (2008) conception of a “biopolitics of disposability” and Titchksoky’s (2010) critical analysis of the cultural production of disability as a “disposable disruption” the worth of a life is determined using a utilitarian calculus that is, to reference the Tylenol campaign once more, “tough on pain” (Johnson &
Johnson, 2013). Discovering one’s true normal (and with it, one’s subject position) involves accepting normalcy as the grounds of life itself and, at the same time, bearing witness to capitalism as the one true human universal. Recent reports of global happiness surveys support this perspective (Graham, 2011). Through vocabularies of resilience, popular assumptions about what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ about capitalist relations of labour and exchange organize consciousness of subjectivity. These assumptions, structured by neoliberal ideology and economic practices that redefine individuals as consumers, suggest that there is no alternative to capitalism. An unproductive and unprofitable norm is not only an obstacle to the ‘good life’ but to the survival of life itself.

Kelly Fritsch provides an insightful critical analysis of such exclusionary forms of inclusion in her exploration of the International Symbol of Access (ISA). According to Fritsch, “Happiness is an affective economy that allows us to have contact with good objects,” capacitating some bodies and bodily relations at the expense of incapacitating and debilitating others. The “not yet” described by Greco and Stenner is given form by Fritsch as the “crip to come” (see also Titchkosky, 2011). Also thinking with affect, Patty Douglas analyzes what she refers to as the “phenomenon of autism mothers”. Douglas suggests that translation is both governmental and (un)ethical, and that understandings of human flourishing can be enlarged by “being-present-with” embodied difference. The social and spatial relations between gender and affect are further explored in Bock’s examination of emotion discourse and the “stigmatized vernacular” of women’s illness narratives. Within these three papers marginality appears as a question of culture and embodiment, and not just a problem to be solved or difference to be transcended.

Within global happiness discourses the appearance of a common world, communicated by way of expert knowledge of global problems, is represented as progress. Each of the articles provides a position from which translations of happiness can be viewed as essential to the fiction of the complete self, and preservation of a common world, as fully ordinary orders. The specific ways in which each addresses and reconciles the question of ‘what happiness is’ dislocate naturalistic assumptions of the body that reduce its appearance to a sign of all that is right or wrong with the world.

The Daily Pulse of the Global(ized) Body

This is not occupation of territory, on the one hand, and independence of persons on the other. It is the country as a whole, its history, its daily pulsation, that are contested […] (Fanon, 1965, p. 65)

One might suggest that medical translations of happiness are setting the feel and tone for how social progress and national development are understood on a global scale. Is happiness a mood? Perhaps not, but much may be gained in orienting to happiness as a form of situated consciousness. Focusing on the Canadian context, Chris Chapman suggests that the acknowledgement of complicity in oppression requires the cultivation of a ‘troubled consciousness’, and with it an unsettled relation to identity and refusal to rest easy with one’s social and spatial positions. The “bifurcated approach to happiness” introduced by Greco & Stenner is a central feature of colonization. Building on Dei’s understanding of colonization as “anything dominating or imposing” (2009, p. 15), Kempf asserts that, “Colonization is the process whereby abstract social locations become sites for concrete oppressions” (2009, p. 16). Colonization cannot be reduced to an event in world history that left its mark on the present. It is, rather, an assemblage of embodied process that involves the imposition of dominant culture through the exploitation and appropriation of material wealth as well as control over mental life. What Kempf refers to as “abstract social locations”, and what could be understood in terms of social types, become actual sites of oppression. These processes are expressed in Hwahng’s analysis, powerfully so in the following assertion: “As someone who grew up fully ensconced within the ‘racist social scripting’ of Asian Americans as the ‘model minority’ (Lowe, 1996), I have felt cut off from the richness of information flow that is possible from their embodiment as Koreans because of the suppression of their histories and realities.”
Many of the papers in this issue draw attention to the global circulation of psy-knowledge as a means of rationalizing exploitation and oppression. A small number of self-proclaimed global bodies lay claim to expertise on the subjective lives of the world’s people. This form of colonization is particularly insidious. Marginalization is made concrete through demonstrations of the inferiority of the marginalized and through facts and figures that reify and naturalize disadvantage. Despite claims to the contrary, and the best intentions, the ordinary (dominant) ways of addressing marginalization reproduce the authority of conventional knowledge about the meaning of social locations, and with it, political and psychic processes of colonization.

As a tool of colonization, the meaning of happiness is transformed into a measure of what’s working or not working, as well as a means of constructing new improved tools for assessing and evaluating the worth of communities under the auspices of development. But in global happiness discourse, happiness does not only offer a measure of what’s working or not, but who’s working or not. This occurs on two levels. On the first level, the types of people who do and do not have ‘gainful employment’ and on another, who does and does not fit as a labourer within the capitalist schema (Titchkosky & Aubrecht, Forthcoming). The appearance of happiness, therefore, provides a (bio)marker of who is imagined and welcomed within an image of the global community.

Conclusion

Chandler and Rice reflect on the relationship between happiness and the cultural production of non-conforming or ‘unruly’ bodies as uninhabitable. They ask,

In the midst of the requirement to be happy while living in an ableist, fat-phobic culture in which our bodies are not recognised as inhabitable, how can we, disabled and fat people, create and find moments of alterity in/of happiness? How can we locate, and even dwell in an alterity, where we can express happiness in difference rather than in spite of it and, at the same time, not discount social suffering caused by ableism and fat-phobia?

Their reflection is anchored in an analysis of “biopedagogies”, which they define as assemblages of “information, advice, and instruction about bodies, psyches, health, and well being, often moralizing or lecturing in tone, that works to control people by using praise and shame alongside ‘expert knowledge’ to urge their conformity to mental and physical norms.” An excellent example of an analysis of biopedagogies is presented in Söderfeldt and Verstraete’s examination of the role of happiness in the establishment and transformation of care structures and practices for persons with disabilities by way of their consideration of the question of whether the blind or the deaf should be considered the most unhappy. In Silke’s paper we are reminded that any struggle to live is also a “struggle for human dignity” (Gilly, as cited in Fanon, 1965, p. 12) that is critical of systems thinking and versions of happiness that restrict knowledge of happiness to indicators of ‘quality of life’ (for a disability studies critique of quality of life see Asch, 2001).

As Marcus and Baehrisch illustrate, the pursuit of happiness is oriented by predefined aesthetic ideals that can lead individuals to pursue goals that may be self-defeating. Through happiness the search for something else, alterity, becomes material, tangible, double, real, through happiness that a beyond (figured in terms of a ‘not yet’ or a ‘to come’) materializes as an object of desire, and the desirer a subject of government. A rather melancholic relation to happiness is thus observed in which, whatever happiness is, it is best treated as some ‘thing’ (for example, a smile) that can be known, recorded, preserved and made part of the archive, so as to be expected. One might even say there is something pedagogical to this melancholia, given that it rests on recognition of happiness as a lesson (to be) learned, a benchmark that must be met in order to pass. In this issue O’Brien advocates for a more sustainable understanding of happiness which recognizes that “our happiness and well-being are intertwined with
the happiness and well-being of other people, other species and the natural environment.” O’Brien provides a detailed history of this global movement in happiness, beginning with Bhutan, and recommendations for how to integrate this knowledge on the ground within educational systems. Ng and Fisher follow O’Brien and resist a dismissive relation to well-being, proposing instead multi-level psychological understandings of well-being that challenge Cartesian dualism.

Thus far we have considered translations of happiness as mediations of the world. These understandings recognize a performative to happiness: happiness does something. Morgan, who closes this special issue, frames happiness in terms of nothing to do. Through case studies, Morgan invites his reader to consider the possibility that relations to happiness are not only the product of naturalistic views that define individuals in terms of bodily capabilities and constraints. Thinking with Morgan, relations to happiness also appear in the form of moments of recollection. The task for socially just pedagogies and praxes then becomes how to nurture the appearances of such moments without reducing them to empty signifiers of life itself: how to recognize vitality in terms of being open to the embodied actuality of a moment, and the difference moments can make to how life is lived, experienced and understood. Conventional dichotomous notions of happiness that restrict happiness to a continuum along which individuals are defined in terms of degrees of pleasure or pain should be discarded for the violence they enact. Such understandings of happiness compel the willful forgetting of death, loss and grief in the interest of self-preservation. Titchkosky opens this issue with a critical understanding of translation as an invitation for self-reflexivity and an occasion for encountering happiness as a social act. It is to this opening that the issue now turns.

Acknowledgements

The guest editor would like to extend a sincere thanks to all the contributors for their important, timely work; to Rod Michalko, Tanya Titchkosky and James Williams for their encouragement to think with and through happiness and governance, and above all, to David Reggio for the space and opportunity to do happiness differently.

References


